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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) has brought along immense benefits to our daily
lives encompassing a diverse range of application domains that we regularly
interact with, ranging from healthcare automation to transport and smart
environments. However, due to the limitation of constrained resources and
computational capabilities, IoT networks are prone to various cyber attacks.
Thus, defending the IoT network against adversarial attacks is of vital
importance. In this paper, we present a novel intrusion detection approach for
IoT networks through the application of a deep learning technique. We adopt
a cutting-edge IoT dataset comprising IoT traces and realistic attack traffic,
including denial of service, distributed denial of service, reconnaissance and
information theft attacks. We utilise the header field information in individual
packets as generic features to capture general network behaviours, and develop
a feed-forward neural networks model with embedding layers (to encode high-
dimensional categorical features) for multi-class classification. The concept of
transfer learning is subsequently adopted to encode high-dimensional categorical
features to build a binary classifier. Results obtained through the evaluation
of the proposed approach demonstrate a high classification accuracy for both
binary and multi-class classifiers.
1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) has proliferated into our daily life at a very rapid
pace. Recent statistics show IoT devices have pervaded into various domains,
including smart cities (28.6%), industrial IoT (26.4%), eHealth (22%), smart
homes (15.4%) and smart vehicles (7.7%) [6]. Moreover, the number of IoT
devices in use has seen a steep rise from 15.4B in 2015 to 26.7B in 2019, with
numbers continuing to climb as households and businesses alike are increasingly
becoming dependent on Internet-based services for their routine activities.
Many critical infrastructures also comprise of IoT devices. For instance, the
smart grid has been constantly interacting with IoT devices that measure
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electricity grid parameters and report these back to a central computing device,
for processing.
Advances in IoT technologies have demonstrated benefits to users. However,
IoT devices have also been exposed to cyber threats as posed by the adversary
due to the heterogeneity in the communication protocols and constrained
resources and large-scale proliferation of IoT devices. For example, one
commonly used application protocol in IoT networks is the Message Queuing
Telemetry Transport (MQTT). The MQTT protocol is lightweight in nature
and based upon the publish-subscribe model of communication; using the
MQTT protocol, IoT devices can communicate with centralised computing
nodes through intermediary brokers [15]. However, the MQTT protocol suffers
from many vulnerabilities that open up the IoT space to the ever-evolving
adversarial threat, including device compromise, data theft, limited resource
access for legitimate IoT nodes, and Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks for
communicating IoT device pairs.
Intrusion detection systems are designed and developed to foster rapid and
accurate identification of malicious attempts by the adversary to penetrate into
IoT networks and to cause system disruption. The application of artificial
intelligence (AI) for the timely detection of malicious attacks, is both necessary
as well as effective. The range of AI techniques applicable for network intrusion
detection (i.e., for detecting malicious attacks through analysis of network
traffic) is very broad. Many AI techniques, including support vector machines
(SVM) [12], Bayesian networks [3], principal component analysis [9], and genetic
algorithms [20], have been popularly deployed for the detection of anomalous
behaviour in IoT networks. However, deep learning based intrusion detection
for IoT networks is still under-researched.
In this work, we propose a novel intrusion detection approach against cyber
attacks for IoT networks based upon the concept of deep learning. We design
the classifier as a feed-forward neural networks model with embedding layers
to identify four categories of attacks, namely distributed denial of service
(DDoS), denial of service (DoS), reconnaissance, and information theft, whilst
differentiating these from the legitimate network traffic. In addition, the
encoding of high-dimensional categorical features is extracted through network
embedding and applied to binary classifier via transfer learning.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [7]. We have extended the
earlier version with (1) a thorough investigation of header fields and inclusion
of new features, (2) design of a feed-forward neural networks model with
embedding to deal with high-dimensional categorical features for multi-class
classification, and (3) employment of transfer learning to build a feed-forward
neural networks model for binary classification with low-dimensional continuous
vector representation of high-dimensional categorical features. The proposed
classifiers in this extended work have demonstrated a significant improvement
of performance regarding all evaluation measures. Main contributions of the
paper are as follows.
• Adoption of a newly published IoT dataset with realistic attack traffic and
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simulated IoT traffic in a smart home scenario;
• Generation of generic features based on the header field information
in individual IP packets to avoid the attack-oriented feature selection
procedure;
• Design and development of the deep learning based intrusion detection
approach including both binary and multi-class classifications for IoT
networks with high accuracy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the
background to the study. Our proposed intrusion detection framework is
presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide a description of the dataset,
design of the experimental setup, and analysis of the obtained results. A
discussion on future directions of the work is provided in Section 5, and the
paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. Related Work
In this section, we briefly survey the state-of-the-art literature in intrusion
detection approaches for traditional and IoT networks with the support of
machine learning and deep learning techniques.
Approaches for traditional networks: Haddadi et al. [8] proposed a
feed forward neural network-based approach to detect DoS, root to local (R2L),
user to root (U2R), and probe attacks in the DARPA dataset [13]. A feed
forward neural network comprises an input, a hidden and an output layer, with
each layer consisting of several neurons. During the training phase, various
strategies and mathematical operations are incorporated into the neural network
to tune weights that interconnect the three layers until an optimal solution
is obtained. The back propagation algorithm is the most commonly adopted
algorithm in training neural networks to update and choose optimal weights of
the interconnections which minimise the loss. Authors reported an accuracy of
over 96% in detecting three attack categories among four categories available in
the DARPA dataset.
An approach using an ensemble of classifiers was proposed in [11] to detect
DDoS attacks. In their approach, the dataset was split into smaller subsets
and each subset was trained using an ensemble of classifiers. Results of
individual classifier were combined through the adoption of a weighted majority
voting technique which assigns a different weight to each algorithm. The back
propagation algorithm was incorporated into the classifier. Their approach
obtained an accuracy of 99.4% in classifying attacks in several publicly available
datasets.
Al-Zewairi et al. [2] proposed a deep learning model for detecting network
based attacks in the UNSW-NB 15 dataset [14]. Their model consists of five
hidden layers along with ten neurons distributed across each hidden layer. A
10-fold cross validation technique was implemented by the authors to train the
model on the full dataset in 10 epochs. In addition, the importance of features
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was ranked using the Gedeon method to identify top contributing features. The
proposed approach achieved an accuracy of approximately 99% on the selected
dataset.
An approach based on the radial basis function was proposed in [4] to detect
DoS attacks. Authors applied radial basis function as the first layer to reduce the
training bias which improves the weight optimisation technique of traditional
neural networks. The proposed approach achieved an accuracy of 99.69% when
tested on the NSL KDD [18] and the UNSW-NB 15 [14] datasets. In a similar
work, Shone et al. [17] adopted a deep network composed of deep auto encoders
stack to perform an unsupervised feature learning which is further combined
with a random forest classifier. Their approach was test via the NSL KDD [18].
Approaches for IoT networks: Koroniotis et al. [10] deployed an IoT
testbed to generate an IoT dataset, namely Bot-IoT, due to the lack of realistic
IoT traffic in existing datasets. Authors incorporated instances of legitimate
and simulated IoT traffic into the dataset along with the attack traffic, including
DDoS, DoS, reconnaissance and information theft. Several new features were
developed based on correlation coefficient and joint entropy techniques and three
machine learning and deep learning algorithms were adopted. The classifiers
were evaluated on 5% of the original dataset for binary classification (i.e., normal
traffic and attack traffic of each subcategory) and achieved good accuracy
demonstrated through the results. However, the extracted dataset contains
imbalanced normal and attack traffic as the number of instances in some attack
categories (i.e., DDoS, DoS, and reconnaissance) is much higher than the number
of instances in the normal traffic.
Abeshu et al. [1] proposed a stacked auto-encoder-based unsupervised deep
learning framework for distributed attack detection in IoT networks with a fog
computing layer. In specific, fog nodes are responsible for parallel training
and model/parameter update. Authors pre-trained the stacked auto-encoder
model with unlabelled training data to extract hidden features which were then
applied to test data for classification. They evaluated the proposed approach
using the NSL KDD [18] with 41 features. The deep learning model obtained a
higher detection accuracy compared to a shallow learning model (i.e., without
pre-training).
Thamilarasu et al. [19] employed a deep belief network (DBN) to construct a
feed-forward deep neural network (DNN) for anomaly-based intrusion detection
in IoT networks. In specific, DBN layers can be pre-trained using unsupervised
learning technique and then taken as hidden layers in the DNN. Authors
implemented an IoT testbed with 6 sensors to form a smart home scenario
and evaluated the proposed model using the network traffic generated from the
testbed. The model achieved high precision, recall, and F1 score for various
attacks compared to an existing intrusion detection approach based on inverse
weight clustering.
Roopak et al. [16] compared the performance of four deep learning models
in DDoS attacks against IoT networks. The four models include multi-
layer perceptron (MLP), convolution neural network (CNN), long short-term
memory (LSTM), and a combination of CNN and LSTM. Authors adopted the
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CICIDS2017 dataset with 82 flow-based features for evaluation. Comparison
results demonstrated that a combination of CNN and LSTM achieved a better
performance while MLP had the least performance compared to other neural
networks models.
Baig et al. [5] proposed the usage of average dependence estimators for
detecting DoS attacks in smart IoT sensors. Authors deployed a custom IoT
testbed via MQTT protocol and incorporated DoS attack scenarios based on the
protocol. Several packet level features such as source & destination IP addresses
and port numbers, frame length, IP packet length, TCP segment length, and
header length, were used in generating the dataset. Two estimators, namely
averaged one-dependence estimator (A1DE) and averaged two-dependence
estimator (A2DE), were adopted and compared with several traditional machine
learning algorithms. Evaluation results indicated that A1DE/A2DE-based
classifier achieved higher accuracy compared with other classification algorithms
when tested on the custom dataset and BoT-IoT testbed [10].
Summary: there is little research on deep learning based intrusion detection
solutions for IoT networks. Among current approaches, some approaches
used the datasets without IoT traces [1, 16] while others focused on binary
classification [10, 19]. We can see that one critical reason could be the lack
of reliable IoT datasets with the inclusion of attack traffic. In this paper, we
adopt the newly published Bot-IoT dataset in [10], develop a novel deep learning
based detection approach with generic features in packet level, and perform both
binary and multi-class classification.
3. Proposed Framework
Figure 1: Workflow of the framework.
In this section, we provide a description of the proposed framework
for detecting intrusions in IoT networks. Figure 1 shows the framework
comprising of four phases: feature extraction, feature preprocessing, training
and classification. We explain them in detail as follows.
• Feature extraction: the first phase is to collect the raw network traffic
using a network analyser tool (e.g., tcpdump). Relevant fields are then
extracted from packets in the raw network traffic, with each field referring
to a feature. Features adopted in this work are not based on aggregated
packets but header fields from individual packets. Hence, generic features
of the traffic could be captured rather than generating attack specific
features which might only work for detecting specific attack behaviours.
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We focus on header fields of an IP packet, such as frame, IPv4/IPv6
and TCP/UDP related information. Details of the extracted features are
discussed in Section 4.2.
• Feature preprocessing: the second phase is to preprocess the extracted
field information by combining, removing, and encoding column values.
For categorical data, we apply one-hot encoding to low-dimensional feature
columns and embedding (incorporated with the feed-forward neural
networks model) to high-dimensional feature columns. The preprocessed
data is split into training and testing sets which are used in the training
phase and classification phase respectively. Packets in both training and
testing sets are labeled as either malicious or normal. Malicious packets
are further labelled with the specific attack category it belongs to. Testing
packets are used only for evaluating the model accuracy in predicting
attacks. Details of the feature preprocessing procedures are discussed in
Section 4.3.
• Training: the training phase takes the processed data from the training
set and feeds it into a feed-forward neural networks model. We consider
both binary and multi-class classification. We develop a feed-forward
neural networks model with embedding layers for multi-class classification,
wherein a range of attack categories are treated as separate classes in
addition to the class of normal traffic. We then extract weights from the
embedding layers to encode high-dimensional categorical feature columns
and build a second feed-forward neural networks model to perform binary
classification. Details of the model architecture and tuning process are
discussed in Section 4.4.
• Classification: the final phase is to evaluate the classifiers on the
specified testing set. The binary classifier outputs either a normal or
attack label for each data instance in the testing set while the multi-class
classifier outputs class labels (i.e., normal or specific attack class that it
belongs to). Analysis of the evaluation results is presented in Section 4.5.
4. Evaluation and Analysis
In this section, we first introduce the dataset used in the evaluation and
then discuss feature extraction and feature preprocessing. Lastly, we provide
description of the experiment setup and analysis of results.
4.1. Dataset Description
We use the BoT-IoT dataset developed by Koroniotis et al. [10] in the
Cyber Range Lab of the UNSW Canberra Cyber Centre. Authors deployed
a testbed to collect legitimate traffic from simulated IoT devices along with
malicious traffic of various attacks. Five types of IoT devices were considered
in the testbed to form a smart home scenario, including a weather station, a
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smart fridge, a smart thermostat, a remotely controlled garage door, and smart
lights. In specific, the testbed consists of virtual machines (VMs) as attack
or target machines, network devices (e.g., pfSense firewall), and simulated IoT
devices running on normal VMs which are also connected to the IoT hub of
the Amazon Web Services (AWS). These simulated IoT devices publish data
using the MQTT procotol to the MQTT broker. There are four categories
(ten subcategories) of malicious traffic generated in the dataset, including DoS
and DDoS attacks over TCP, UDP and HTTP, probing attacks (port scanning
and OS fingerprinting), and information theft (data exfiltration and keystroke
logging). The detailed description of the testbed setup and statistics of attacks
could be found in the paper [10].
Reasons to adopt the dataset include the configuration of real testbed,
collection of realistic attack traffic, generation of simulated IoT traffic in a smart
home scenario, and inclusion of labelled data.
4.2. Feature Extraction
Raw traffic in the BoT-IoT dataset was collected in the format of PCAP
files. Authors labelled the raw traffic while collecting it and generated network
flows by using the Argus tool. The processed traffic was stored in Argus files
and further converted to CSV files. Labels in both Argus files and CSV files are
flow-based. However, we need to retrieve labels on individual packets in order
to perform the packet-level detection via our framework. We started with the
collection of the PCAP files and obtained a total of 344 PCAP files from the
BoT-IoT dataset. The PCAP files were organised into ten attack subcategories,
namely DoS/DDoS over TCP, UDP and HTTP, service scan, OS fingerprinting,
Keystroke logging, and data exfiltration.
We extracted individual packet header information from the PCAP files
using the TShark tool, labelled the packets and output them into the CSV files.
We then converted the CSV files to a single Apache Parquet file, unified the
schema, and extracted roughly 2% of the processed dataset. We explain details
of each step in the following.
Feature description: we only considered IP packets and extracted a total
of 29 packet header fields from the PCAP files shown as follows. ARP packets
were excluded because they are used to convert an IP address to a MAC address
and irrelevant to the proposed attacks in the dataset.
• Frame related fields: frame.time epoch, frame.len
• IP related fields: ip.proto, ip.src, ip.dst, ipv6.src, ipv6.dst, ip.ttl, ip.id,
ip.hdr len, ip.len, ip.flags.df
• TCP related fields: tcp.srcport, tcp.dstport, tcp.stream, tcp.time delta,
tcp.time relative, tcp.analysis.initial rtt, tcp.flags, tcp.window size value,
tcp.hdr len, tcp.len
• UDP related fields: udp.srcport, udp.dstport, udp.stream, udp.length
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• HTTP related fields: http.response.code, http.request.method,
http.content length
The TCP/IP protocol suite is vulnerable to a variety of attacks. The header
fields of an individual packet could reflect generic features of the traffic and any
deviation of values from a normal range in the fields could potentially become
an indicator of attacks. For example, TCP, UDP, and HTTP are commonly
exploited by attackers to launch protocol-based DDoS/DoS attacks; TCP and
UDP are generally the protocols used in port scanning; OS fingerprinting works
by sending TCP, UDP, and ICMP probes to known open and closed ports of the
target; during post-exploitation, data could be exfiltrated via different channels
(e.g., HTTP, TCP) while keystrokes could be observed via a reverse HTTP/TCP
connection.
Label mapping: we analysed network flows in the original labelled dataset
and replicated same labels for all individual packets within network flows.
In specific, as described in [10], attack traffic of different subcategories was
launched at different times with normal traffic generated in the background,
which makes it easier to differentiate attacks; in addition, there are four bot
machines deployed to launch attacks, which enables us to differentiate normal
and attack traffic based on IP address of bot machines. Therefore, we developed
a script to match the IP address of the bot machine and label packets with each
attack subcategory. Labelled packets are stored in the CSV files for further
processing. These CSV files with labelled traffic are placed in different folders
based on the subcategory of attacks.
File conversion and schema unification: we converted the CSV files
to a single Apache Parquet file, which reduces the file size and improves the
processing speed. During conversion, we also unified the schema of all files. In
specific, some ICMP packets contain the UDP packet inside the ICMP payload
due to the recognition of the embedded packet by the network protocol analyser.
Therefore, some IP related fields (e.g., ip.proto, ip.ttl) could be either string type
(i.e., two values separated by comma) or double type. We enforced all values in
those columns to be string type for consistency. Table 1 shows statistics of the
processed dataset with extracted features.
Dataset extraction: we selected roughly 2% of the processed dataset with
extracted features. For each subcategory of attacks, we used all packets when
the number of packets is lower than 1 million and selected 1 million packets if the
number of packets is larger than 1 million. For the normal traffic, we selected
roughly 2% from all normal packets. In specific, for each attack subcategory with
more than 1 million packets, the random selection was implemented through
choosing a fraction of total packets of that attack subcategory (i.e., the fraction
is 1 million divided by the total number of packets). Therefore, the number of
chosen packets fluctuates slightly either above or below 1 million. The number
of packets extracted is 11252406 including a mix of normal and attack traffic.
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Table 1: Statistics of the processed dataset with extracted features.
Category Subcategory Number of packets
DDoS
HTTP 194417
TCP 95643746
UDP 174344218
DoS
HTTP 287480
TCP 59977444
UDP 191208992
Reconnaissance
OS fingerprinting 827940
Service scanning 3814730
Information theft
Data exfiltration 301710
Keylogging 11387
Normal Normal 23175520
Total 549787584
4.3. Feature Preprocessing
We used a high performance computing (HPC) cluster with one Tesla V100
GPU and 93G RAM to preprocess extracted features in the Parquet and run the
proposed deep learning model. We first selected fields that can be used as inputs
into the deep neural networks model. We dropped the timestamp column (i.e.,
frame.time epoch) and IPv4/IPv6 address related columns (i.e., ip.src, ip.dst,
ipv6.src, and ipv6.dst). We combined four pairs of columns respectively because
values in those two columns of each pair do not overlap with each other. The
four pairs of these columns include: tcp.srcport and udp.srcport; tcp.dstport
and upd.dstport; tcp.len and udp.length; tcp.stream and udp.stream. Combined
columns are named as src.port, dst.port, length, and stream. We split columns
with comma separated values (i.e., ip.ttl, ip.id, ip.hdr len, and ip.len) into
two columns while non-embedded packets are filled with NaN values in the
second column. Afterwards, we filled NaN/None values with either numeric
values or string values. For numeric columns with meaningful zero values (e.g.,
ip.flags.df, tcp.flags, src.port, and dst.port), we obtained the maximum value
in each column and filled NaN values with the maximum value plus 1. For
the string column (i.e., http.request.method), we filled None values with ‘0’ (in
string type). For other columns, we filled NaN values with 0.
After dropping several irrelevant columns, duplicated rows were introduced.
We dropped redundant rows because the testing traffic should not have
duplicates from the training traffic. Without redundancy, we will be able to
check how the model will perform on unseen data in the testing phase. Table 2
presents statistics of the dataset before and after dropping duplicates rows.
We can see that the total number of packets being kept is roughly 81.44% of
the processed dataset while the majority of packets being dropped are normal
packets with a drop rate of 45.08%.
We identified feature columns with categorical data. For columns with
low-dimensional categorical variables (i.e., ip.proto, tcp.flags, ip.flags.df, and
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Table 2: Statistics of the dataset before and after dropping duplicated rows.
Category Subcategory
Drop duplicated rows
Before After
DDoS
HTTP 194417 194417
TCP 999444 999444
UDP 1000055 1000054
DoS
HTTP 287480 287480
TCP 998703 998703
UDP 999977 999977
Reconnaissance
OS fingerprinting 827940 827058
Service scanning 999895 999895
Information theft
Data exfiltration 301710 301710
Keylogging 11387 11387
Normal Normal 4631398 2543626
Total 11252406 9163751
http.response.code), we applied one-hot encoding and dropped original columns.
We refer these columns and other columns with non-categorical values as
input columns. For columns with highly-dimensional categorical variables (i.e.,
src.port, dst.port, and http.request.method), we separated them from other
columns and will apply embedding in the deep neural networks model to
compute a dense representation of ports and HTTP request methods. We
refer these three columns as embedding columns. We normalised input columns
within a given range between (-1, 1) to avoid extreme values and potentially
help in speeding up calculations. We stored input columns, port embedding
columns and embedding column for HTTP request methods as three arrays.
We also encoded label columns. We considered both binary classification
(i.e., classify normal packets and attack packets from each subcategory of
attacks separately) and multi-class classification (i.e., classify normal packets
and malicious packets from DDoS/DoS, information theft and reconnaissance
attacks). In the binary classification, a normal packet is labelled as 0 while an
attack packet is labelled as 1; in the multi-class classification, packets from each
class are labelled from 0 to 3 respectively. Labels for each classification were
stored as an array.
4.4. Experimental Setup
We used TensorFlow library and Keras. All our experiments were effected
on the HPC cluster with Tesla V100 GPU. We split the extracted dataset with
64%-16%-20% on training, validation, and testing in a stratified fashion thus
training, validation, and testing sets have approximately the same percentage
of samples of each class as the complete set. We introduced class weights to the
training data due to the imbalanced samples of different classes. The weight
for each class was given by the inverse of the quotient value from dividing the
packet count in one particular class by the maximum packet count among all
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classes. In this manner, the under-represented class with a relatively smaller
number of samples obtains a higher weight value.
4.4.1. Model Design
We consider to use feed-forward neural networks (FNN) models. For multi-
class classification, the FNN model has two embedding layers and three dense
layers. For binary classification, we applied the concept of transfer learning by
using the embedding vectors resulting from embedding layers in the FNN model
for multi-class classification. We initialised both models with random weights.
We applied Adam optimiser and a sparse categorical cross-entropy loss function.
We denote the FNN model for multi-class classification as mFNN and the model
for binary classification as bFNN and explain them in details as follows.
mFNN: Figure 2 shows the architecture of the FNN model along with
interactions with the loss function and the solver for multi-class classification.
mFNN model takes three arrays as inputs in which two of them are inputs for
the embedding layers. The port embedding layer has an input dimension of
65537 (with all official and non-official ports between 0 and 65535 and 65536
encoded for NaN values) and an output dimension of 16 while HTTP request
method embedding layer has an input dimension of 93 (with a number of 92
official request methods and a string encoded for none values) and an output
dimension of 4. The model consists of three dense hidden layers with each input
neuron being connected with each output neuron in each hidden layer. The
first two hidden layers have 512 neurons and use a ReLU activation function in
each layer while the last hidden layer has 4 neurons corresponding to 4 classes
and uses a Softmax function which turns numbers into probabilities that sum
to one.
bFNN: Figure 3 shows the architecture of the FNN model for binary
classification. bFNN model uses weights of the two embedding layers from
mFNN model to encode source/destination ports and HTTP request methods;
the encoded columns (i.e., src.port, dst.port, and http.request.method) are then
combined with other columns and taken as input into the model. bFNN model
has three dense hidden layers with the first two hidden layers consisting of 512
neurons and using a ReLU function in each layer and the last hidden layer
having 2 neurons and a Softmax function.
4.4.2. Model Tuning
We tuned mFNN model with different hyperparameters and three
regularisation techniques. We used same hyperparameters and regularisation
optimisation for bFNN model because we want to apply the generalisation of
the model to different cases. We discuss the regularisation and tuning procedure
for the multi-class classification in details in the following paragraphs. We used
the FNN model with three dense hidden layers, 512 neurons in the first two
hidden layers and default learning rate of Adam optimiser (i.e., 0.001) as the
baseline model.
Regularisation: we first experimented with three commonly used
regularisation techniques including L1, L2, and dropout. Results show the
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Figure 2: FNN model for multi-class classification.
classification accuracy does not improve. That said, regularisation is proven
effective for preventing over-fitting. Since our model is trained on a dataset
with millions of samples, the over-fitting problem is a less concern.
Hyperparameter tuning: we then experimented with different
architectures of the neural networks, including adding/reducing hidden layers
(ranging from two to four hidden layers), increasing the number of neurons in
hidden layers (including 512 or 1024 neurons; excluding the last dense layer),
and adding dropout with dropout rate of 0.1 in hidden layers (excluding the
last dense layer). Results demonstrate that the baseline neural networks model
with three hidden layers and 512 neurons in the first two layers has the best
12
Figure 3: FNN model for binary classification.
performance. Different variants of the neural networks model do not increase
the classification accuracy. One possible reason could be that the complexity
of the model is either too small or too large. When the model complexity is
too small, the model may not be capable of capturing the variation of different
classes in the training data; when the complexity is too large, the model tends
to over-fit different classes in the training data. Therefore, the model with too
large/small complexity would make the performance on specific classification
problems worse. Lastly, we experimented with different learning rates of Adam
optimiser, including 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001, and 0.00001. We chose the learning rate
of 0.0001 which gives highest accuracy. A larger learning rate tends to oscillate
over training epochs, causing weights to diverge while a smaller learning rate
could possibly get stuck on a sub-optimal solution.
We also applied an early stopping technique with a patience of 5 iterations
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to terminate the training as soon as the validation loss reaches a minimum.
This has the advantage of reducing over-fitting problem. The FNN model was
trained with a batch size of 256 and the maximum epoch was set to be 20.
4.5. Analysis of Results
We discuss results for the multi-class classification and binary classification.
We compute confusion matrices for both classification problems and use
following metrics to evaluate the model performance in the binary classification:
accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score. In specific, accuracy is defined as the
number of correct predictions, including true positive (TP) and true negative
(TN) predictions, divided by the total number of predictions; precision is the
number of TP predictions divided by the total number of predicted positive class
values; recall is the number of TF predictions divided by the number of actual
positive class values; F1 score is weighted average of precision and recall. A low
precision indicates a large number of false positive (FP) predictions (normal
packets classified as attack packets) while a low recall could indicate a large
number of false negative (FN) predictions (attack packets classified as normal
packets); a good F1 score indicates low FP/FN predictions because it combines
precision and recall. Table 3 shows definitions of the metrics in terms of positives
and negatives.
Table 3: Definitions of metrics.
Accuracy
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
Precision
TP
TP + FP
Recall
TP
TP + FN
F1 score 2× Precision×Recall
Precision + Recall
Multi-class classification: Table 4 shows the confusion matrix for the
multi-class classification with packet count and percentage value. mFNN model
achieves a high accuracy of 99.79% over four classes of traffic classification. For
predicting traffic of one class over traffic of the other three classes, the accuracy
is above 99% respectively. In addition, there is no misclassification between
DDoS/DoS or normal traffic and information theft traffic. For DDoS/DoS
attacks, the model misclassified 2314 packets (0.258%) as reconnaissance traffic
while for reconnaissance attacks, the model misclassified 1540 packets (0.421%)
as DDoS/DoS traffic. The reason could be behaviours of reconnaissance attacks
reflected through the current feature set have similarity with behaviours of
DDoS/DoS attacks which makes it difficult to distinguish between these two
attacks. Regarding the runtime, the mFNN model completed the training and
validation procedures with roughly 42 minutes.
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Table 4: Confusion matrix for the multi-class classification for various attack types
Actual/Predicted Normal DDoS/DoS Information theft Reconnaissance
Normal 508702 (99.995%) 1 0 22
DDoS/DoS 4 893697 (99.741%) 0 2314 (0.258%)
Information theft 0 0 62615 (99.992%) 5
Reconnaissance 13 1540 (0.421%) 13 363825 (99.571%)
Binary classification: Table 5 shows confusion matrices for the binary
classification. We can see the classification for normal traffic and malicious
traffic from each subcategory of attacks achieves high accuracy, precision, recall,
and F1 score (i.e., 99.99%) with only a few packets misclassified.
All attack traffic in the dataset was generated via standard tools (e.g., Nmap,
Hping3, Metasploit framework). In reality, attackers could use different options
of the same tools (e.g., packet sending rate, payload size) or different tools for
the attack configuration; some intelligent attackers could also apply evasion
techniques. However, the header fields contained in the packets could be kept
similar to achieve the same attack goal (e.g., a SYN flood attack needs to set
SYN flag in tcp.flags field). Therefore, the attack traffic in the dataset still
reflects genuine behaviours by attackers, which demonstrates the applicability
of the proposed model.
4.6. Comparison of Results
As a final step, we applied the SVM model [11] to the multi-class
classification problem and compared the classification accuracy and runtime
of SVM with those of mFNN model. We discuss the input, model settings and
results for multi-class classification in detail in the following paragraphs.
We used the same dataset without redundant row values shown in Table 2.
We identified categorical columns and mapped three highly-dimensional
categorical variables (i.e., src.port, dst.port, and http.request.method) to low-
dimensional categorical variables. For src.port and dst.port columns, we
obtained a list of common ports (i.e., 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 42, 43, 53, 80, 161,
443), kept these common ports in original port columns and map uncommon
ports to new columns. This list was constructed based on well-known ports for
various services, including FTP, SSH, Telnet, DNS, SMTP, HTTP/HTTPS, and
SNMP. We generated two new columns for src.port and dst.port respectively:
one for the port number between the range of 0 and 1023 but does not belong
to the well-known port list; another for the port number larger than 1023
(i.e., registered/private ports). For http.request.method column, we maintained
row values containing a single method (i.e., ‘POST’, ‘GET’, ‘OPTIONS’,
‘PROPFIND’, ‘HEAD’, and ‘TRACE’) or ‘0’ for NaN and mapped values
containing comma separated multiple methods to a string named ‘MULTIPLE’
(e.g., ‘GET,GET’, ‘HEAD,HEAD,HEAD’). We then applied one-hot encoding
to all low-dimensional categorical variables. Due to the long convergence time
of the SVM model, we performed random subsampling out of 9163751 samples
with sample sizes of 10000, 100000, and 1000000 (i.e., 10.9%). We randomly
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Table 5: Confusion matrices for the binary classification for various attack types
Actual/Predicted Normal DDoS over HTTP
Normal 508725 1
DDoS over HTTP 0 38883
Actual / Predicted Normal DDoS over TCP
Normal 508724 1
DDoS over TCP 0 199889
Actual / Predicted Normal DDoS over UDP
Normal 508725 0
DDoS over UDP 0 200011
Actual / Predicted Normal DoS over HTTP
Normal 508725 1
DoS over HTTP 0 57496
Actual / Predicted Normal DoS over TCP
Normal 508724 1
DoS over TCP 1 199740
Actual / Predicted Normal DoS over UDP
Normal 508725 0
DoS over UDP 0 199996
Actual / Predicted Normal Data exfiltration
Normal 508726 0
Data exfiltration 0 60342
Actual / Predicted Normal Keylogging
Normal 508726 0
Keylogging 0 2277
Actual / Predicted Normal Service scan
Normal 508710 16
Service scan 4 199975
Actual / Predicted Normal OS fingerprint
Normal 508721 4
OS fingerprint 0 165412
selected samples so as to follow the same distribution (i.e., proportion) of data
from different classes. We also applied feature scaling to normalise inputs within
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a range between (-1, 1).
We used a linear Support Vector Classifier (SVC) from the Scikit Learn
library1. Due to the imbalanced nature of the different classes in the dataset,
class weights were introduced to the training data. We followed the same weight
calculation performed for mFNN model. For each subsampled set, we tuned the
SVC via grid search by cross validation with a list of penalty parameter values,
including 0.1, 1, 10, 100, 1000, and 10000. The penalty parameter controls
the trade-off between smooth decision boundary and correct classification of
training points; a higher value allows fewer outliers while a lower value allows
more outliers thus avoiding over-fitting. We applied a 5-fold cross validation
on each set with a 80%-20% training and testing split. We placed a limit of
10000 on maximum number of iterations to be run. In line with our other
experiments, we used the same HPC cluster. We retrieved the optimal penalty
parameter value from the grid search for each set (i.e., 1000 for the set with
sample size of 10000 and 1000000; 100 for the set with sample size of 100000)
and applied the SVC with the optimal value to training and testing.
Table 6 illustrates accuracy and runtime results for the three subsampled
sets. The class size represents the number of selected samples in each class in
the order of normal, DDoS/DoS, information theft, and reconnaissance traffic
while the runtime is the training time under the optimal penalty parameter
value. From the table, we can see that the SVC yields a slightly higher accuracy
with larger sample size. That said, the runtime also increases moderately.
In addition, the model did not converge due to the limitation on maximum
number of iterations. So without the iteration limit, the model could run until
it converges thus incurring higher accuracy; however, this may increase the
runtime dramatically due to the uncertainty of the convergence time. Thus,
we could conclude the proposed FNN model for the multi-class classification is
more time efficient over large dataset compared with the SVC.
Table 6: Accuracy and runtime of SVC for the multi-class classification
Sample size Class size Accuracy Runtime (min)
10K (2817, 4912, 328, 1943) 97.90% 0.35
100K (27739, 49203, 3418, 19640) 98.15% 8.40
1M (277800, 488896, 34037, 199267) 98.26% 144.61
5. Discussion and Future Work
By extracting the header field information of individual packets as generic
features and developing the FNN models, we are able to differentiate normal
and attack traffic with high accuracy and low FP and FN predictions. However,
we have encountered several issues and aim to address these in our future work.
1Scikit is widely accessible at https://scikit-learn.org
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For the multi-class classification, we considered four categories at the current
stage because we observed the model yielded sub-par performance for certain
subcategories of attacks (e.g., DDoS over HTTP and DoS over HTTP). The
reason could be that the field information for the individual packet could
not capture certain attack behaviour in a large scale (e.g., a flood of traffic
generated in DDoS attacks). Therefore, we are planning to develop a classifier
to differentiate each subcategory of attacks as part of the future work. We will
include the timestamp information, process header fields of individual packets
aggregated from timestamps, and develop a new deep neural networks model
to incorporate these new features. Long-short term memory networks could be
the best option to model time series data. In addition, the current classifier
works in the batch mode. We will implement the online mode for real time
detection. We also plan to investigate feature ranking techniques for time-series
feature-based classifiers.
6. Conclusion
Deep learning techniques have shown its potential to serve as a solution for
the intrusion detection problem in IoT networks. Through the proposal of an
intelligent intrusion detection approach, we have developed feed-forward neural
networks models along with the extraction and preprocessing of the header field
information in individual packets, treated as generic features, and adopted the
concepts of neural network embedding and transfer learning to obtain encoding
of highly-dimensional categorical features of data. We have tested the efficacy of
the models for both binary and multi-class classification on a dataset comprising
realistic network traffic. Through the evaluation results, we have demonstrated
the performance of the proposed approach. In particular, the capability of the
classifier in binary classification was illustrated through results close to 99.99%
across all evaluation measures including accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score
while the detection accuracy of approximately 99.79% was achieved for multi-
class classification. The results are significant and warrant further research in
this domain of cyber security for IoT networks.
References
[1] Abeshu, A., Chilamkurti, N., 2018. Deep learning: The frontier
for distributed attack detection in fog-to-things computing. IEEE
Communications Magazine 56, 169–175.
[2] Al-Zewairi, M., Almajali, S., Awajan, A., 2017. Experimental evaluation
of a multi-layer feed-forward artificial neural network classifier for network
intrusion detection system, in: Proceedings of the 2017 International
Conference on New Trends in Computing Sciences (ICTCS), pp. 167–172.
[3] Alhakami, W., ALharbi, A., Bourouis, S., Alroobaea, R., Bouguila, N.,
2019. Network Anomaly Intrusion Detection Using a Nonparametric
Bayesian Approach and Feature Selection. IEEE Access 7, 52181–52190.
18
[4] Amma, N.G.B., Selvakumar, S., 2019. Deep Radial Intelligence with
Cumulative Incarnation approach for detecting Denial of Service attacks.
Neurocomputing 340, 294–308.
[5] Baig, Z.A., Sanguanpong, S., Firdous, S.N., Vo, V.N., Nguyen, T.G., So-In,
C., 2020. Averaged dependence estimators for DoS attack detection in IoT
networks. Future Generation Computer Systems 102, 198–209.
[6] Bera, A., 2019. 80 Mind-Blowing IoT Statisitics (Infographic). https:
//safeatlast.co/blog/iot-statistics/. Accessed on 2019-07-11.
[7] Ge, M., Fu, X., Syed, N., Baig, Z., Teo, G., Robles-Kelly, A., 2019. Deep
Learning-Based Intrusion Detection for IoT Networks, in: 2019 IEEE 24th
Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC),
pp. 256–25609.
[8] Haddadi, F., Khanchi, S., Shetabi, M., Derhami, V., 2010. Intrusion
Detection and Attack Classification Using Feed-Forward Neural Network,
in: Proceedings of the 2010 Second International Conference on Computer
and Network Technology, pp. 262–266.
[9] Hoang, D.H., Nguyen, H.D., 2018. A PCA-based method for IoT network
traffic anomaly detection, in: Proceedings of the 2018 20th International
Conference on Advanced Communication Technology (ICACT), pp. 381–
386.
[10] Koroniotis, N., Moustafa, N., Sitnikova, E., Turnbull, B., 2019. Towards
the Development of Realistic Botnet Dataset in the Internet of Things
for Network Forensic Analytics: Bot-IoT Dataset. Future Generation
Computer Systems 100, 779–796.
[11] Kumar, P.A.R., Selvakumar, S., 2011. Distributed denial of service attack
detection using an ensemble of neural classifier. Computer Communications
34, 1328–1341.
[12] Kumari, V.V., Varma, P.R.K., 2017. A semi-supervised intrusion detection
system using active learning SVM and fuzzy c-means clustering, in:
Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on I-SMAC (IoT in Social,
Mobile, Analytics and Cloud) (I-SMAC), pp. 481–485.
[13] McHugh, J., 2000. Testing Intrusion Detection Systems: A Critique of
the 1998 and 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection System Evaluations As
Performed by Lincoln Laboratory. ACM Transactions on Information and
System Security 3, 262–294.
[14] Moustafa, N., Slay, J., 2016. The Evaluation of Network Anomaly Detection
Systems: Statistical Analysis of the UNSW-NB15 Data Set and the
Comparison with the KDD99 Data Set. Information Security Journal: A
Global Perspective 25, 18–31.
19
[15] Naik, N., 2017. Choice of effective messaging protocols for IoT systems:
MQTT, CoAP, AMQP and HTTP, in: Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE
International Systems Engineering Symposium (ISSE), pp. 1–7.
[16] Roopak, M., Tian, G.Y., Chambers, J., 2019. Deep learning models for
cyber security in iot networks, in: 2019 IEEE 9th Annual Computing and
Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC), IEEE. pp. 0452–0457.
[17] Shone, N., Ngc, T.N., Phai, V.D., Shi, Q., 2018. A Deep Learning Approach
to Network Intrusion Detection. IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics
in Computational Intelligence 2, 41–50.
[18] Tavallaee, M., Bagheri, E., Lu, W., Ghorbani, A.A., 2009. A detailed
analysis of the KDD CUP 99 data set, in: Proceedings of the 2009
IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence for Security and Defense
Applications, pp. 1–6.
[19] Thamilarasu, G., Chawla, S., 2019. Towards deep-learning-driven intrusion
detection for the Internet of Things. Sensors 19, 1977.
[20] Zhang, Y., Li, P., Wang, X., 2019. Intrusion Detection for IoT Based on
Improved Genetic Algorithm and Deep Belief Network. IEEE Access 7,
31711–31722.
20
